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I. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
This paper examines whether decreases in a firm’s carbon emissions causes
that firm’s profit to increase. The premise is that consumers concerned about climate
change prefer products that are less carbon intensive. Carbon intensity is the amount
carbon emitted due to the production and consumption of one unit of a good. Consumers
experience disutility when their actions cause CO2 concentration to rise, harming the
environment and other people. Because of this disutility, they are willing to pay a higher
price for relatively less carbon intensive products. For example, a consumer may decide
to shop for groceries at Whole Foods rather than Cub Foods. Similarly, a consumer may
decide to purchase a Tesla Model 3 (an electric car) instead of a Toyota Corolla (a
gasoline car). The idea is that consumers can differentiate carbon intensities between
otherwise similar products.
Firms have an opportunity to affect the demand curve they face by reducing their
carbon intensity, but to do so involves an investment cost. There are many ways a firm
may reduce carbon intensity. They could switch to low-carbon energy sources, purchase
more energy efficient capital, research new production technology, generate energy
onsite, et cetera. The common theme is that all of these options have a cost. Firms must
maximize profits by choosing how much to invest in carbon intensity reduction.
Taking such actions to reduce emissions is one form of Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR). CSR is defined as “meeting the needs of a company’s direct and
indirect stakeholders (employees, clients, pressure groups, communities, etc.), without
compromising its ability to meet the needs of future stakeholders as well” (Dyllick and
Hockerts 2002). A stakeholder is “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by
the achievement of the organization's objective” (Freeman 1984). In the context of
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carbon emissions, stakeholders include anyone in the world who experiences the costs
of climate change. CSR does not mean that firms act altruistically; a firm that reduces
carbon emissions to maximize profits also participates in CSR. That is the concern of
this paper: whether reduction in carbon intensity increases profit, holding other
determinants of profit constant.
There is a vast economic literature discussing the theoretical and empirical
implications of CSR. Motivations for empirical research in CSR today come from
theoretical arguments first made 60 years ago. Economists observed that spending on
CSR per firm quadrupled between 1950 and 2000 (Caplow 2001). The earliest economic
writing criticized this behavior. Levitt (1958) argued on purely theoretical grounds that
firms destroyed wealth when they spent resources on objectives other than maximizing
their own profits. In a famous New York Times article, Milton Friedman (1970) argued
that firms spending resources on CSR was theft from their stockholders, managers, and
employees. Friedman’s explanation for the increase in CSR spending was “political
subversion” of the decision-makers within firms. Margolis (2003) has retroactively called
this anti-CSR school of thought “Economic Contractarianism.”
Two economic theories, called the Stakeholder Theories, developed in response
to Levitt and Friedman’s criticisms (Freeman 1984). The first was normative Stakeholder
Theory, which argued that firms had an ethical obligation to their stakeholders. The
second was descriptive Stakeholder Theory, which argued that firms that spent money
on CSR were profit-maximizing, and searched for evidence to support that claim. The
descriptive theory said that consumers preferred to purchase products from firms whom
they deemed good. Therefore, monopolistically competitive firms could affect demand
through investment in CSR. The descriptive theory directly rebutted the Economic
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Contractarian argument; by engaging in CSR, firms created wealth. This thesis tests the
hypotheses from descriptive Stakeholder Theory, as I seek to learn whether CSR is
consistent with profit-maximizing behavior.
The CSR literature changed from a theoretical debate to a search for empirical
evidence regarding Stakeholder Theory and Economic Contractarianism. Moskowitz
(1972) wrote the first empirical work, finding a positive correlation between CSR and
share prices by looking at a panel of 14 firms. Vance (1975) took the same dataset as
Moskowitz and showed that these companies grew slower than their non-CSR peers on
the S&P 500 and Dow Jones Indices. A meta-analysis by Margolis (2003) found that
between 1972 and 2002 there were 127 studies searching for a causal relationship
between CSR and financial performance. Margolis concluded that the total results of
these studies suggested a weak positive relationship. He found that 70 of the studies
concluded that there was a positive relationship, while 57 of the studies found no
relationship, a negative relationship, or mixed results. Margolis stipulated, however, that
the majority of these studies failed to address problems with empirical estimation that
were common across the literature: omitted variables, endogeneity, poor samples, and
unreliable measures of CSR and financial performance dependent variables.
Since the late 1990s, the literature has made efforts to address the estimation
problems laid out by Margolis. Three dependent variables have become common as
measures of financial performance. 1The most common measure is share prices (Curran
and Moran 2007; van Dijken 2007; Consolandi 2009; and Cheung 2010). These papers

In addition to these analyses of high market value companies in the US stock exchanges, there I some
studies that use smaller samples. For example, Wagner (2002) looks at the relationship between forest
sustainability practices and profit in the paper industry. Curran and Moran (2007) examines at the shocks
in stock prices of companies that I recently included or deleted from the FTSE4Good UK 50 Index. Both
papers found a positive relationship between CSR and profit.
1
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seek to answer whether CSR creates wealth for investors. But share prices do not
necessarily reflect market fundamentals. It could be the case that prices change
according to expected future profit and other variables in financial markets. What
investors expect to happen to profits in the future may differ from what actually happens
to profits in the future. If that’s the case, then a positive relationship between share
prices and CSR does not necessarily mean that profit increases as a result of the CSR
action, meaning that the conclusions of those papers do not fully answer the question
posed by this paper2. The next most common measure of financial performance is
Tobin’s Q (Lo and Sheu 2007; Wagner 2010; Garcia-Castro et al. 2010) 3. This measure
falls to some of the same methodological problems as share prices because the
numerator is determined by the price of shares. The advantage of Tobin’s Q is that it
measures expectations of profit against that actual value of assets, therefore controlling
for overestimated expectations. The final measures of financial performance are various
accounting measures such return on assets and accounting profit (López et al. 2007;
Garcia Castro et al. 2010). These dependent variables are less sensitive to forces on
financial markets. Conclusions about the relationship between financial performance and
CSR vary within all dependent variables, so the choice of dependent variable cannot
explain the variation in estimation results.
Some recent work has found that the inclusion of certain control variables affects
the results. Specifically, a set of papers found that controlling for firm size, industry, and
risk (of investment) changes the results of the effect of CSR on stock price (Aupperle et

However, if share prices do accurately indicate current period profit, then the conclusions of Curran and
Moran (2007); van Dijken (2007); Consolandi (2009); and Cheung (2010) do reveal information about the
CSR-profit relationship. The conclusions I mixed.
3 The Tobin's Q ratio is calculated as the market value of a company divided by the replacement value of
the firm's assets (Investopedia 2016).
2
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al., 1985; Coombs and Gilley, 2005; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Pava and Krausz, 1996;
Waddock and Graves, 1997b). The results of these papers vary, but they all look at
stock price as a dependent variable explained by various measures of CSR. Firm size
may matter because it affects the visibility of CSR actions to consumers. People are
more likely to notice Target’s CSR activities than those of Georgetown Cupcakes. The
same reasoning applies to the industry control variable. Consumers and stakeholders
are more knowledgeable about downstream industries like retail than upstream
industries like iron ore mining.
Wagner (2010) found that including the advertising intensity of the markets of
firms in his panel data set increased the positive significance of the relationship between
CSR and financial performance. Advertising intensive industries are more sensitive to
changes in public perception. CSR has the effect of boosting the company’s public
image. McWilliams and Siegel (2000) show that including R&D intensity decreases the
significance of the relationship, but that it remains positive. The reason may be that R&D
intensive companies have higher return investments to make other than CSR, so the
R&D intensive companies that do invest in CSR experience lower profit.
I have read one paper that controls for endogeneity between profit and CSR. The
argument for endogeneity is that firms that earn more profit can afford to invest more in
CSR. Garcia-Castro et al. (2010) use a set of three instrumental variables to predict
CSR ratings according to KLD4 score. The instrumental variables are an industry
dummy, corporate governance measures, and inclusion on the S&P 500 (to proxy for
visibility). Garcia-Castro et al. observe that when these instruments are included, the

4

A stock index that provides social responsibility ratings for all companies included in the index.
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relationship goes from significantly positive to insignificantly negative. They conclude
that more work must be done to control for endogeneity between profit and CSR.
This paper contributes to the literature by examining whether carbon intensity
reductions result in greater profit. I use carbon emissions data from surveys conducted
by CDP, a non-profit organization. These surveys are distributed every year to the 500
largest companies in the world measured by market capitalization. Carbon emissions are
an objective quantity, unlike many of subjective indices previously used in the literature
such as KLD scores and inclusion on the Dow-Jones sustainability index. I can compare
and measure the differences in carbon intensities between firms, whereas indices are
not as comparable. This characteristic of my data allow me to apply a difference-indifference method to measure the effect of carbon emissions on profit, a method
previously unused in the literature. The difference-in-difference model controls for
variables that would otherwise confound the estimation. In addition to the new
application of empirical techniques, this paper develops a theoretical model to explain
consumer and firm behavior with respect to carbon emissions.
The empirical models all find a significant negative relationship between profit
and carbon intensity. Profit increases as a company become less carbon intense. The
results also suggest that carbon intensity matters in some industries but not others. Data
constraints prevent me from drawing conclusions about specific industry effects due to
small numbers of observations in some industries. I conclude that the results are
evidence in support of the theory that companies can increase profit by decreasing
carbon intensity. There are significant questions about the results addressed in the
robustness section.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II develops a theoretical
model to explain how companies can earn greater profit through reductions in carbon
intensity. Section III discusses the data and their advantages and disadvantages.
Section IV explains the empirical estimation technique. Section V shows the results.
Section VI tests the robustness of results and lays out unaddressed potential
weaknesses. Section VII concludes.

II. THEORY
The model developed in this section aims to explain the relationship between
changes in carbon intensity and profit in an oligopolistic market. There are two profitmaximizing firms that produce goods (𝑋1 and 𝑋2 ) with different carbon intensities for each
good. The model occurs over two periods. In the first period, the firms emit the same
amount of carbon per unit produced (aka carbon intensity). They may invest I to reduce
their carbon intensity in the next period. A greater investment results in greater reduction
in carbon intensity. In the second period each firm faces a different demand curve
(unless they invested nothing in the first period).
Consumers are endowed with income N and choose to consume some quantity
of the two goods. They maximize utility function 𝑈(𝑋1 , 𝑋2 , 𝐶), subject to their income
constraint. The variable 𝐶 is the total carbon emissions produced by goods consumed,
and is a function of 𝑋1 and 𝑋2 . The utility function could be expressed only as a function
of 𝑋1 and 𝑋2 , but keeping the 𝐶 in the model makes it clear how carbon emissions affect
consumer and producer behavior.
The key to the model is that the carbon emissions variable in the utility function
enables firms to differentiate themselves and affect demand. Firms make their
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investment decision based on expectations about what the other firm will invest. The
firms achieve Nash Equilibrium when they maximize profits across the two periods given
their expectations about the other firm’s strategy.

a) Demand
The goal of this subsection is to show how consumer preferences about carbon
intensities affect the demand curve. Consumers seek to maximize their utility
𝑈(𝑋1 , 𝑋2 , 𝐶). Assume for the moment that the marginal disutility of carbon emissions
does not depend on the quantity of goods and that the marginal utilities of goods do not
depend on carbon emission levels. In other words, I am assuming that the utility function
takes some additive form 𝑈 = 𝑓(𝑥1 , 𝑥2 ) + 𝑔(𝐶). Then the constrained optimization
problem requires the consumer to meet these three first-order conditions:
max 𝜃𝑥1 𝑥2 𝜆 = 𝑈(𝑋1 , 𝑋2 , 𝐶) − 𝜆(𝑃1 𝑋1 + 𝑃2 𝑋2 − 𝑁)
(1)
(2)
(3)

𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝑥1
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝑥2
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝜆

=
=

𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑥1
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑥2

𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝐶

+ 𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑥 − 𝜆𝑃1 = 0
1

𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝐶

+ 𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑥 − 𝜆𝑃2 = 0
2

= 𝑁 − 𝑃1 𝑋1 − 𝑃2 𝑋2 = 0

𝜕𝑈

The 𝜕𝑥 terms in each equation represent that marginal utility provided by the
𝑖

𝜕𝑈

good. The 𝜕𝐶 terms represent how much the utility changes for each unit of carbon
𝜕𝐶

emitted, and 𝜕𝑥 is the carbon intensity of the good. Combining the three first-order
𝑖

conditions, I get

(4)

𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝐶
+
𝜕𝑥1 𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑥1

𝑃1

=

𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝐶
+
𝜕𝑥2 𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑥2

𝑃2
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The interpretation of equation 4 is that the sum of the marginal utility of the good
and the marginal disutility of carbon emissions per dollar must be equal for both goods.
This equation can illuminate how changes in carbon intensity can affect the consumption
of goods. Suppose that the carbon intensity of 𝑥1 increases. I know that

𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶

is negative

because I have assumed that consumers receive disutility from the carbon emissions of
their goods. The sum of marginal utilities decreases.
In order for equation 4 to hold, either the marginal utility of 𝑥1 must increase or
marginal utility of 𝑥2 must decrease. The consumer in this model has no control over the
price or carbon intensity of either good. For the marginal utility of 𝑥1 to increase, the
quantity consumed of 𝑥1 must decrease (assuming that there exists diminishing marginal
utility of the good). The end result is that the consumer reacts to the increase in 𝑥1 ’s
carbon intensity by decreasing consumption of good 𝑥1 and increasing consumption of
𝑥2 .
Suppose that the goods are identical in every way except for carbon intensity.
The reason I want to do this is so that I can think about a duopolistic market with
identical goods. Now the marginal utilities of the goods must be equal. The only
difference between the numerators in equation 4 comes from the marginal disutility of
carbon emissions. Equation 4 indicates that the result is a corner solution, because the
less carbon intense good always has greater marginal utility per dollar, as long as prices
are held constant. Realistically, the less carbon intense good would probably have a
greater price than the other, which means that a corner solution is not necessary.
If I specify a function for utility, then I can derive a demand curve for the goods.
Suppose that a consumer’s utility function is
(5)

𝛽

𝑈 = 𝑥1𝛼 𝑥2 𝐶 𝛾

Fortune 11
such that 0 < 𝛼 < 1, 0 < 𝛽 < 1, and 𝛾 < 0. I am returning to a utility function in which
consumers receive different marginal utilities from each good. Note that this specific
utility function does not fit in the general case considered in equations 1-4 because this
function does not assume that the utility function is additive. The demand for 𝑥1 is5
(6)

𝑥1 =

−𝑃2 𝐶 𝛾 (𝛼+𝛽)

𝑃2

𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝐶
𝛽𝐶𝛾 𝑃2 𝑃1
−
∗𝑃1 −
𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑥1 𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑥2
𝐼

It is difficult to interpret the meaning of individual terms in the demand function,
but I can understand how quantity demanded changes with the parameters. The two
parameters of interest are the carbon intensities of 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 . If I derive 𝑥1 with respect to
the carbon intensities, the resulting equations are
(7)

𝜕𝑥1
𝜕

𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑥1

𝜕𝑥1

(8)

𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑥2

Because I have assumed that

𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶

=

𝐶 𝛾 (𝛼+𝛽)
𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝐶 2
(
)
𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑥1

=

−𝑃2 𝐶 𝛾 (𝛼+𝛽)
𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝐶 2
(
) 𝑃1
𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑥2

is negative, I know that the quantity demanded

of 𝑥1 decreases with the carbon intensity of 𝑥1 and increases with the carbon intensity of
𝑥2 . Note that these derivations assumed that carbon intensity does not change with the
quantities demanded. If that were not the case, then I would have to account for the
carbon level term remaining inside

𝜕𝑈
.
𝜕𝐶

This assumption may not reflect a market in which

companies experience economies of scale. For instance, it may require a certain amount
of energy to run a machine for an hour, regardless of the production of that machine.

5

The derivation of equation 6 is provided in the appendix
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Therefore, the company has to consume no additional energy to produce more goods as
long as the machine is not at capacity.
The important result of equations 7 and 8 is that changes in carbon intensity can
decrease quantity demanded decreases while keeping price constant. Graphically, this
is a downward shift of the demand curve. If producers can decrease their carbon
intensity by changing production technology, then they can affect the demand curve they
face in the future. I have demonstrated that when consumers receive disutility from
carbon emissions, changes in carbon intensity cause downward shifts in the demand
curve. I showed this generally for the utility functions that are additive (𝑈 = 𝑓(𝑥1 , 𝑥2 ) +
𝛽

𝑔(𝐶)) and also for a particular non-additive utility function (𝑈 = 𝑥1𝛼 𝑥2 𝐶 𝛾 ). I also had to
impose the assumption that carbon intensity does not change with quantity produced.
Relaxing these assumptions does not necessarily alter the results of these models, but it
depends on the specific utility and carbon emissions functions.

b) Supply
This subsection explains how producers choose the level of carbon intensity
investment which maximizes profits. In the first period, the market is a homogenous
duopoly. They face the same price which is a function of the sum of their produced
quantities. For the sake of simplicity, I assume that the firms face a linear demand
function derived from a cumulative utility function which includes a term for carbon
emissions.
(9)

𝑝 =𝐴−𝐵∗𝑋

(10)

𝑋 = x1 + x2
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The parameters A and B are constants. Let each firm faces the same marginal cost of
production. Given equations 9 and 10 and that firm 1 maximizes profits, I find that the
reaction curve for firms 1 and 2 are
(11)

x1 =

𝐴−𝐵∗x2 −𝑀𝐶
2𝐵

(12)

x2 =

𝐴−𝐵∗x1 −𝑀𝐶
2𝐵

The parameter MC is the marginal cost of both firms 1 and 2. The profit
maximizing quantities are attained through the reaction curves. Solving for x1 and x2
results in
(13)

𝑥1 = 𝑥2 =

𝐴−𝑀𝐶
3𝐵

Both firms produce the same quantity. The potential difference between firms A
and B in period 1 is their expectations about what the other firm will invest. As
demonstrated in the discussion of consumer demand, the demand for a good depends
on both its own carbon intensity as well as the carbon intensity of the other firm.
Therefore, the expected return on investment in carbon intensity may depend on the
competitor’s investment. The objective of the firms in period 1 is to maximize profits in
the period while choosing the level of investment that maximizes period 2 profits minus
investment. Since period 1 profit does not depend on investment, the quantity produced
in period 1 has no effect on the investment decision.
The market in period 2 becomes a heterogeneous duopoly because the goods
are differentiated through different fixed carbon emissions for each firm. Now the firms
face their own demand curves. Specifically,
(14)

𝑃1 = 𝐴1 − 𝐵1 x2 − 𝐶1 x1

(15)

𝑃2 = 𝐴2 − 𝐵2 x2 − 𝐶2 x1
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Note that the price of each good is a function of the quantity of both goods. This reflects
that the goods are similar enough that one firm’s production decision affects the
consumer’s willingness to pay for the other. But the goods are different enough to have
different prices.
The parameters that characterize the demand curves are 𝐴𝑖 , 𝐵𝑖 , and 𝐶𝑖 . These
parameters are determined by the consumer’s utility function. As shown in the
discussion of consumer demand, an increase in the carbon intensity of 𝑥1 shifts its
demand curve downward but shifts the demand for 𝑥2 upward. For example, suppose
the consumer’s utility function is such that
𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝐶
, )
𝜕𝑥1 𝜕𝑥2

(16)

𝐴1 = 𝑓(

(17)

𝐴2 = 𝑔(𝜕𝑥

𝜕𝐶
1

𝜕𝐶
, 𝜕𝑥
)
2

Under the assumption that consumers receive disutility from carbon emissions,
𝐴1 and 𝐴2 must increase with their own carbon intensities and decrease with the carbon
intensity of the other good. To show how profit changes carbon intensity, I need to know
how profit changes with 𝐴1 and 𝐴2 . The reaction curves derived from equations (14) and
(15) are
(18)

𝑥1 =

𝐴1 −𝑀𝐶−𝐵1 𝑥2
2𝐶1

(19)

𝑥2 =

𝐴2 −𝑀𝐶−𝐶2 𝑥1
2𝐵2

The optimal quantities attained by substituting equations (18) and (19) are

(20)

𝑥1 =

𝐴1 −𝑀𝐶 𝐵1 𝐴2
−
2𝐶1
4𝐶1 𝐵2
𝐵 𝐶
1− 1 2
2𝐵2
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(21)

𝑥2 =

𝐴2 −𝑀𝐶 𝐵2 𝐴1
−
2𝐶2
4𝐶2 𝐵1
𝐵2 𝐶1
1−
2𝐵1

No definite statement can be made about the relationship between the quantities
and the 𝐴𝑖 parameters. Taking the derivatives does not add any additional clarity. The
direction of the derivatives depends on the other parameters in the demand equations.
Therefore, no definite statement can be made about the relationship between profit and
𝐴𝑖 , and the conclusions of the model are ambiguous. Conclusions can only be drawn
when information about the other parameters are known, which can only be learned
empirically.
Even if the profit-carbon intensity relationship is not ambiguous, the behavior of
firms is still not clear. If the expected benefit of carbon intensity investment depends on
the competitor’s carbon intensity, then firms have to make decisions based on the
expected outcomes. Suppose that firms can only make a binary investment at a fixed
cost. Consider decision tree 1.
Decision Tree 1
Does Firm
1 Invest?

Does Firm
2 Invest?

Payoff

Yes

Firm 1: $200, Firm 2: $200

No

Firm 1: $700, Firm 2: $100

Yes

Firm 1: $100, Firm 2: $700

No

Firm 1: $500, Firm 2: $500

Yes
Firm 1’s
investment
decision
No
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The quantities in parentheses represent the expected net benefits of each
decision combination. Both firms investing is the worst total outcome because they
spend resources investing in carbon intensity reduction but gain no advantage in carbon
intensity over the competitor. Yet both firms still invest because the outcome is better for
investing regardless of what the competitor does. In the game with only two time
periods, cooperation is impossible because both firms always experience the temptation
to break any agreement, and they each know that the other firm has experiences that
temptation. In a game with infinite periods, it is possible for the firms to cooperate
because there is no definite end period in which firms are tempted to break the
agreement.
Because the profit-carbon intensity relationship is theoretically ambiguous, the
true payoff structure could differ greatly from decision tree 1. Consider decision tree 2:
Decision Tree 2

Does Firm
1 Invest?

Does Firm
2 Invest?

Payoff

Yes

Firm 1: $200, Firm 2: $200

No

Firm 1: $700, Firm 2: $300

Yes

Firm 1: $300, Firm 2: $700

No

Firm 1: $500, Firm 2: $500

Yes
Firm 1’s
investment
decision
No
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In decision tree 2, it is not clear what the firms will do. If firm 2 invests, then firm 1
is better off not investing. If firm 2 does not invest, then firm 1 is better off investing. If the
firms cannot coordinate their actions, then the firms will make a decision based on
expected outcomes and the expected decision of their competitor. Note that decision
tree 2 still maintains the same assumption as in decision tree 1 that an investor has an
advantage over a non-investor and that both firms investing is the worst outcome for
them.
In summary, the theoretical model makes ambiguous predictions. The ambiguity
comes at two levels. First, it is not clear that reductions in carbon intensity necessarily
result in greater profit. Second, it is not clear that firms would invest in carbon intensity
reduction even if it can increase profits. The model makes many simplifying assumptions
that may not reflect the real world. For these reasons, empirical estimation of the profitcarbon intensity relationship is crucial.

III. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
The carbon emissions data for this paper come from CDP6, a non-profit
organization whose mission is to facilitate transparency of companies’ environmental
impact around the world. CDP publishes a data set that reports the carbon emissions of
the top 500 companies in the world by market capitalization7. The data span three years
2011-20138. I use only the data of companies from the United States because my
financial data only includes United States companies. There are 343 company-year

CDP was formerly known as the Carbon Disclosure Project.
Market capitalization is the total value of a publicly traded company’s shares. In other words, the price
of its shares times the total number of shares.
8 The CDP survey has been taken for more years than this time span, but I only have access to these years
due to my own financial constraints.
6
7

Fortune 18
observations in the data set. Some companies appear for less than three years because
they entered or exited the sample during the collection period. CDP collects the data
through survey responses, to which companies respond on a voluntary basis. The US
subsample of the survey has 343 respondents and 124 non-respondents, providing a
73% response rate. The number of non-respondents is great enough to cause response
bias. The robustness section addresses the possibility and consequences of response
bias in the results.
CDP reports two different types of emissions. Scope 1 emissions refer to
emissions which happen on-site and under the control of the company. These make up
the majority of emissions for most companies. Scope 2 emissions are from purchased
energy, heat, and steam. Note that on-site energy generation falls into scope 1
emissions. The advantage of including only scope 1 emissions in the econometric model
is that changes in energy prices would not confound the profit-emissions relationship,
unless there is heterogeneity in the cost of on-site energy generation. On the other hand,
scope 1 emissions would not pick up the effect of reductions in a company’s energy
intensity, an important source of carbon emissions reduction. Our primary models use
the sum of scope 1 and scope 2 emissions as the independent variable, but I also
estimate with the separate emissions types for robustness.
Carbon intensity is the emissions divided by revenue9. I use carbon intensity
instead of carbon emissions because intensity relates the quantity of carbon emissions
to the size of the company. Another possible measure of carbon intensity would be
carbon emissions per quantity produced. This measure better corresponds with our
theoretical model, but there are problems with the quantity measure. Different products

9

All financial variables are in real terms.
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of the same company can have different carbon emissions. I would have to use a
weighted average of carbon emissions among different products. The data to perform
this calculation at the company level do not exist for most companies in the sample.
Carbon emissions divided by revenue is a less data-intensive alternative that should not
alter results. Of course, the ideal paper would use both measures.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of carbon intensity. Carbon intensity follows
approximately a log-normal distribution with some extreme values along the tail. There
are two outliers at 0.9931 and 0.9130 tons CO2e/USD. Both of the outliers are
observations of Dominion Resources, a utilities company on the east coast of the United
States. All of the values of carbon intensities are reasonable. It is not surprising that
there are extremes in carbon intensity because the sample is diverse among industries.
Energy utilities naturally have higher carbon intensity than Walmart. It also makes sense
that the order of magnitude of carbon intensity is low. For large companies, revenue is in
the billions of USD.
The financial data come from EDGAR, the SEC database listing all 10-K and 10Q filings10. All publicly traded companies in the United States are required to submit
these filings to the SEC each year. They provide much financial information about each
company. I use the revenue, assets, and profit data from each filing. All values are in
real terms. Profit is the dependent variable in all regressions. The assets variable refers
to the total value of durable goods held by a company. I use this variable as a control in
some regressions. Revenue is only used to calculate carbon intensity. Every company in
the sample has these data. Figures 2, 3, and 4 show the distributions of the financial
data used in this paper.
Thank you to the writers at StockPup (http://www.stockpup.com/data/) for extracting the data from
EDGAR and sharing their work for free.
10
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The financial variables also follow a log-normal distribution. This distribution makes
sense for revenue and assets because a company must make at least certain amount of
revenue to be in the top 500 companies by market capitalization. The minimum cutoff
means that by definition all the extremes occur on the right side, instead of the left side.
Table 1: Summary Statistics (Years: 2011-2013)
Variable

Observations

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Carbon
Intensity

343

0.000486

0.1126

0.0000872

0.9931

Revenue
(Ten Millions)

343

200

296

8.34

2110

Profit (Ten
Millions)

343

20.7

25.9

-3.048

197

Assets (Ten
Millions)

343

708

1670

21.1

10500

All of the independent variables have a standard deviation greater than its mean.
The high variation in the sample means that the econometric models are more capable
of finding a signal in the data. Profit has one less observation because there was one
negative value for unlogged profit in the sample. As discussed above, the extremes
occur on the right side of the distributions, which explains why the maxima tend to be
much further from the means than the minima. The effect of outliers will be discussed in
the robustness section.
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Figure 111

Figure 212

11
12

All values for carbon intensity I positive.
There I two company-years with negative profit.
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Figure 313

Figure 414

13
14

All values for assets I positive.
All values for revenue I positive.
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Table 2 shows the number of observations in each industry. The 5 industries with
the greatest number of observations are finance and insurance, information,
manufacturing 2, manufacturing 3, and wholesale trade. The differences in the size of
industry groups matters for the estimation of models with industry-carbon intensity
interaction terms. Small groups will have larger standard errors and smaller t-scores.
The model is likely commit type 2 errors when industry groups are small.
These data work well to empirically test the model laid out in the theory section.
First, large companies are much more visible to consumers than small consumers.
Greater visibility means that consumers can have information by which they may make
their consumption choices. In terms of the theoretical model, consumers may place a
greater weight on carbon emissions in visible industries (i.e. the gamma parameter is
more negative). Second, many of the companies in the sample are in common
industries, meaning that I can observe within industry effects of carbon emissions on
profit.
The trickiest part of these data is determining whether they represent what
consumers actually observe about carbon emissions. It seems unlikely that a significant
number of consumers research the specific carbon emissions of the products they
purchase. Rather, consumers may make decisions based on general feelings about
carbon intensity. For instance, most consumers know and believe that a Toyota Prius
emits less carbon than the comparable Toyota Corolla. Another question is where
consumers get their information. For example, most companies publish a Corporate
Social Responsibility Report15 detailing their efforts to reduce environmental impact.
Consumers may use those as sources of information. This is only a problem if

15

Example: http://www.generalmills.com/~/media/Files/GRR/GRR_2016_report.pdf?la=en
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companies report different carbon emissions between the CSR report and CDP survey
response.
Table 2: Industry tabulation

Industry

Observations

Adminstrative and Waste Management
Construction
Entertainment
Finance and Insurance
Food Services
Information
Manufacturing 1
Manufacturing 2
Manufacturing 3
Mining and Gas Extraction
Professional, Scientific, and Technical
Services
Real Estate
Retain Trade 1
Retail Trade 2
Transportation
Utilities
Wholesale Trade

4
6
10
66
3
34
12
45
45
35
9
5
27
12
15
14
30

Another problem is that marketing may matter more than actual carbon
emissions performance. I could argue that marketing would not work without actual
results to support it, but it would be naive to assume that marketers need evidence to
run an effective marketing campaign. If there is a difference between our data and what
consumers observe due to marketing, then our models should fail to find a signal of the
emissions-profit relationship or find a weaker signal than what I would otherwise find.

IV. ESTIMATION EQUATIONS
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Every empirical model in this paper uses a random effects estimator. The data do
not contain enough observations for each company to take advantage of fixed effects.
The panel

contains at most three years for a company. Each model has a fixed effect

term for the year of the observation. I use logged profit as the dependent variable
because the order of magnitude of profit is much greater than carbon intensity. An
unlogged dependent variable would make the model heteroskedastic and may
underestimate the statistical significance of the coefficients. The independent variables
are unlogged. After calculating the log-level regressions, I derive the carbon elasticity of
profit at the mean values of carbon intensity and profit. These elasticities are the results
of interest for the models without interactions terms. For the models with interactions
terms, I simply use log-log regressions because it is difficult to attain an estimate of the
elasticities of individual groups when the groups are small.
I begin with the simplest model for the relationship between profit and carbon
emissions:
(E1)

𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵1 + 𝐵2 𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

The symbol 𝜋𝑖𝑡 indicates logged profit, 𝑐𝑖𝑡 indicates carbon intensity of a single
company-year observation, 𝜃𝑡 is the dummy for year, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term for an
observation it. The coefficient 𝐵2 signifies the percentage by which profit increases after
a one unit change in carbon intensity16. This model says little about whether carbon
emissions cause the company-year to earn more profit, but subsequent, more
informative models build off it.

16

I used a specification of the STATA margins command to calculate the elasticity from 𝐵2 .
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Model E2 controls for the heterogeneity in profit between industries by adding
dummies for each industry using 2-digit NAICS codes:
(E2)

𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵1 + 𝐵2 𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

The symbol 𝜇𝑖 indicates the dummy for the industry of observation i. Industry variation
could explain a negative elasticity because industries that are characteristically lower
carbon intensity could earn more profit. For example, it consumes much more energy for
a factory to manufacture a car than a lawyer to try a case, even though the total of
lawyer’s fees at the end of a trial may sum to the price of a car. The dummies pull out
the mean profit for each industry, meaning that the coefficient 𝐵2 does not pick up the
effect of between industry effects.
This is where the industry definitions matter. If industry definitions are not
granular enough – that is, the 2-digit NAICS codes do not capture variation between
industries – then the estimation of 𝐵2 may be inconsistent because heterogeneity in
carbon intensity and profit between industries biases the coefficient. If the codes are too
detailed because a company produces many different products, then the estimation is
inefficient because there are more industry groups than necessary for a consistent
estimation. Ideally, I would use fixed effects to control for time-invariant characteristics of
firms, but the available data do not allow for such a model.
The next model controls for heterogeneity in energy consuming capital by using
the value of assets as a proxy for a company’s use of capital:
(E3)

𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵1 + 𝐵2 𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3 𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

The symbol 𝐾𝑖𝑡 indicates the amount of assets owned by a company in year t.
Heterogeneity in energy consuming capital could positively bias the coefficient 𝐵2 and
elasticity. Clearly, not all assets result in carbon emissions. Financial assets do not emit
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carbon, but manufacturing capital assets do. The assets variable picks up more
heterogeneity than necessary, but it is not important to estimate a consistent coefficient
for assets.
The fourth model is the same as model E3 but with differences between carbon
emissions and profit.
(E4)

𝜋𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑖(𝑡−1) = 𝐵1 + 𝐵2 (𝑐𝑖𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖(𝑡−1) ) + 𝐵3 𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

The coefficient 𝐵2 is interpreted differently in E4 than the other models. Here it means
when the difference in carbon intensity increases by 1, the percent change in profit
increases by 𝐵2 dollars.
The differences model controls for industry level characteristics. As explained
above, industry heterogeneity could explain a negative coefficient if not properly
controlled in models E1 though E3. In the differences model, industry heterogeneity in
the levels of carbon intensity and profit could not explain a negative 𝐵2 coefficient. The
story would have to be that some industries gain more profit faster than others and that
those same industries tend to decrease their carbon intensity from year to year. That
story seems less likely than the industry heterogeneity confounding story in models E1
thorough E3.
The differences model controls for any variable that is confounding in levels but
not differences. Heterogeneity in energy efficiency is another example. In the level
models, energy efficient companies have higher profit because of lower energy costs but
emit less carbon because they can produce the same output while consuming less
energy. Therefore, the result is a negative 𝐵2 coefficient. But in the differences model,
the confounding story must be that firms which have an increasing rate of profit gains
also are becoming more energy efficient each year. Although the differences model
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made the problem a little better, this still is a believable explanation for a negative
coefficient. The robustness section addresses changes in energy efficiency as a
confounding variable.
The last two models add industry interaction terms to models E3 and E4:
(E5)

𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵1 + 𝐵2 𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3 𝐾𝑖𝑡 +𝐵4 𝑐𝑖𝑡 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(E6)

𝜋𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑖(𝑡−1) = 𝐵1 + 𝐵2 (𝑐𝑖𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖(𝑡−1) ) + 𝐵3 𝐾𝑖𝑡 +𝐵4 (𝑐𝑖𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖(𝑡−1) )𝜇𝑗 + 𝜃𝑡 +

𝜇𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
The interaction terms reflect variation in the effect of carbon emission on profit between
industries. The model described in this paper’s theory section suggests that if
consumers have less information about a firm, then the effect of carbon emissions on
profit is diminished. Consumer information may vary at the industry level.
Profit relationships are difficult to estimate because many variables determine
profit. Any of these variables which affects revenue or costs that also decreases energy
intensity is a confounding variable. Energy intensity is one example. As a firm becomes
more energy intense, carbon intensity decreases because the firm consumes less
energy and profit increases because the firm experiences lesser costs. In order to
address this problem, in part, I use the same models to estimate the revenue-carbon
intensity relationship. Fewer variables confound that relationship. A negative coefficient
on carbon intensity for these models is stronger evidence for the consumer-preference
model described in section III. If that model is accurate, I expect to see consistent results
for both profit and revenue.
Another challenge in empirical estimation is endogeneity. The argument is that
profitable companies have more capital to make investments. Some of those
investments may be reductions in carbon intensity. Therefore, profit causes lower carbon
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intensity. The same argument also applies to revenue. I have no empirical tool to
address endogeneity concerns. The theoretical arguments made in section III answer
endogeneity on theoretical grounds.

V. RESULTS
Table 3 summarizes the most important regression result for profit models 1
through 4 – carbon intensity elasticity of revenue. The elasticities are all significantly
negative. The magnitude stays about the same for each model, except for model 4 (the
differenced model) which has a different interpretation than models 1 through 3. The
elasticities for the first four models seem reasonable. If carbon intensity halves, then
profit increases by 10%. I expect to see an inelastic relationship because carbon
emissions only makes up one part of consumer preferences. There are many other
characteristics of goods about which consumer may care. If the results are robust, then
they are evidence in support of the hypothesis that lower carbon intensity results in
greater profit.
One notable result is that R-squared is low in the first model without industry or
asset controls, but increases five-fold with the controls. The low R-squared and low
magnitude on the elasticities mean that carbon intensity explains only a small portion of
variation in profit. It would have been concerning if the models suggested that changes
in carbon intensity explained a large part of variation in profit.
Table 4 presents the carbon intensity elasticities for revenue. The elasticities in
the revenue models are similar to those in the profit models. All elasticities are around 0.10 (except for the differenced models, which are around -0.02). These results are
encouraging. They suggest that the changes to profit are occurring mostly through
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revenue. The empirical results are consistent with consumer preferences being the
cause of profit gains.
The industry dummies are significant in the levels models but insignificant in the
differenced models. This suggests that there is not much variation in first-order changes
in profit between industries. Because there is no variation in profit at the industry level,
the differenced model is robust to industry heterogeneity as a confounding explanation
for the negative coefficient on carbon intensity. The confounding variables must be
heterogeneity in first-order changes. The only surprising result is that the time dummies
are not significant for any model except the differenced model. This suggests that profit
does not tend to vary across years.
The number of observations changes between the level model and the difference
model because the first year for each company has no difference. There is no variation
in profit for each year – as shown by the year dummy – so the dropped years should not
bias the results in the differences. There are 142 companies in the data and 145
observations dropped in the differenced model. The extra 3 are because 3 companies
had observations in 2011 and 2013, so they dropped two observations in the differenced
model.
Regressions 5 and 6 add industry interaction terms to regressions 3 and 4.
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the elasticities calculated from the regressions. Regression 5
finds that the coefficient is only significant for finance and insurance, manufacturing 1,
manufacturing 2, mining and gas, and retail trade 2. Regression 6, the differenced
model, finds that the coefficient is only significant for food service, finance and
insurance, manufacturing 3, and mining and gas extraction. The takeaway from these
results is that the characteristics of industries affect the profit-carbon intensity
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relationship. However, these models do not do a good job identifying precisely for which
industries it matters because some of the industry groups have fewer observations than
the others.
The industries that do have significant coefficients are industries more visible to
consumers than other industries. Consumers interact directly with firms in the retail
trade, food service, and insurance industries. Ethical consumers would be most
concerned with the industries with which they directly interact. Therefore, it makes sense
to see a strong effect of carbon intensity in those two industries. Manufacturing, mining,
and gas companies do not fit that explanation because consumers do not purchase
goods directly from those companies. Rather, these companies may have high
consumer perception because they are the “usual suspects” of carbon emissions.
Energy companies such as Exxon Mobile fall into these categories.
Figures 7 and 8 show the results of the revenue interacted regressions. The most
important result is that every industry that had a significant coefficient in figures 5 or 6
also has a significant coefficient in figures 7 or 8, except for food services. This shows
that carbon intensity is affecting profit through revenue. Two industries, retail and
wholesale trade, had significant coefficients in the revenue figures but not the profit
figure.
Table 2 in summary statistics tabulates the number of observations in each
industry. The 5 industries with the greatest number of observations are finance and
insurance, information, manufacturing 2, manufacturing 3, and wholesale trade. Out of
those 5 industries, only wholesale trade has an insignificant coefficient in neither
regression 5 nor 6. Retail trade 2 and food services have a low number of observations
but a positive coefficient in one of the models. The low number of observations for some
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industries means that the model is likely to commit type 2 errors on the carbon intensity
coefficients for those industries. This is supported by the fact that the industries with
significant coefficients tend to have more observations than the industries with
insignificant coefficients. It would not be wise to interpret figures 5 and 6 as showing
exactly for which industries carbon emissions matters. Rather, one should conclude that
there seems to be heterogeneity in the carbon intensity effect on profit between
industries, and more information is needed to determine precisely how they differ.
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Table 3: Profit Elasticities 17
Model

(E1) Base
Model

(E2) Industry
Fixed Effects

(E3) Asset Control
+ Industry FE

(E4)
Differences

Carbon Intensity
Elasticity of Profit18

-0.1025***

-0.1126***

-0.1094***

-0.0238***

Observations

343

343

343

197

F-Statistic

8.47

4.42

7.60

2.50

Adj. R-Squared

0.0617

0.1602

0.2791

0.1270

***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.10

Table 4: Revenue Elasticities 19
Model

(E1) Base
Model

(E2) Industry
Fixed Effects

(E3) Asset Control
+ Industry FE

(E4)
Differences

Carbon Intensity
Elasticity of Revenue20

-0.0910***

-0.1102***

-0.1070***

-0.01669***

Observations

343

343

343

197

F-Statistic

5.30

4.83

8.19

2.98

Adj. R-Squared

0.0363

0.1754

0.2961

0.2413

***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.10

Table 3 summarizes the key results from the non-interacted profit regressions. Beginning from the left,
each subsequent model adds one new complexity. The appendix contains the full regression results for
each model.
18 Carbon Elasticity of Profit is the elasticity between profit and carbon intensity.
19 Table 4 summarizes the key results from the non-interacted revenue regressions. Beginning from the
left, each subsequent model adds one new complexity. The appendix contains the full regression results
for each model.
20 Carbon Elasticity of Revenue is the elasticity between profit and revenue.
17
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Figure 5: Profit Elasticities by Industry (Levels)
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Figure 6: Profit Elasticities by Industry (Differences)
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Figure 7: Revenue Elasticities by Industry (Levels)
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VI. ROBUSTNESS
There are a number of potential robustness concerns the results. Table 5 lists
each potential robustness problem and its consequence for conclusions.
Table 5: Robustness problems
Robustness problem

Consequences if unaddressed

Within industry energy efficiency

Inconsistent coefficient estimates

heterogeneity
Within industry low carbon energy price

Inconsistent coefficient estimates

heterogeneity
Time

Conclusions limited to sample time period

Firm size

Conclusions limited to sample firm and
comparable firms

Country heterogeneity

Conclusions limited to United States and
comparable countries

Sampling bias

Inconsistent coefficient estimates

Results driven by outliers

Conclusions limited out of sample

Some of these robustness problems have already been discussed in previous
sections. The differenced model eliminates the effect of energy efficiency heterogeneity,
but there could still be a confounding effect if firms that are gaining profit also are
becoming more energy efficient. To test whether the results are robust to energy
efficiency heterogeneity, I run the differences models (models 4 and 6) using only scope
1 emissions, which do not include emissions from purchases electricity. The result is still
a significantly negative coefficient. Scope 1 emissions include emissions generated on-
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site, meaning that heterogeneity in the differences of on-site energy generation
efficiency within industries could explain a negative coefficient. For that to be the case,
on-site energy generation would also have to make up a large portion of companies’
energy sources, but most electricity is purchased from electric utilities. It seems unlikely
that energy efficiency confounds the coefficient in the difference models.
Low carbon energy price heterogeneity could also explain a negative coefficient.
If some companies face a lesser carbon energy price than others, and the price of low
carbon energy is lower than high carbon energy sources, then those firms could receive
higher earnings and emit less carbon. This may be the case in regions where solar
energy is cheap and so companies build on-site solar generation. Without information
about low carbon energy prices faced by specific companies, I cannot control for
heterogeneity at the firm level. Industry controls do allow me to control for heterogeneity
at the industry level, and the difference models are only confounded if there is
heterogeneity in the differences of low carbon energy prices within industries.
The next three robustness problems constrain the conclusions that can be
derived from the results, but do not cause inconsistent coefficient estimates. The
relationship between carbon emissions and profit may change over time. For example,
people may care less about carbon emissions during recessions than boom periods. The
results are robust within the sample time period because of the time dummies, but they
are not robust out of sample. The results may also not be robust to firms out of sample.
The sample includes only some of the top 500 largest companies in the world by market
capitalization based in the United States. This paper’s theoretical model assumes that
firms are oligarchic. It may not apply to smaller firms in more competitive markets.
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Finally, differences in knowledge and opinions about climate change between countries
could result in different coefficients, so conclusions must be limited to the United States.
The carbon intensity data come from a survey, and there may be sampling bias
in the estimates of the coefficients. The bias would arise if survey respondents tend to
earn more profit and decrease their carbon intensity each year, or vice-versa. Low
carbon intensity firms may be more likely to respond because they want to publicize their
results. There is no way to test that hypothesis about carbon intensity. I can, however,
observe that there is no significant difference in the means of profit between the two
groups. Table 6 summarizes the profits.

Table 6: Respondents vs Non-respondents
Group

Mean of Logged
Profit

Standard Deviation

Observations

Respondents

21.77

0.9845

344

Non-respondents

21.33

0.9586

123

The results may be sensitive to outliers. Figure 9 shows the actual and fitted
values of profit versus carbon intensity for model 4 (the differences model with no
interaction terms). The farthest outliers have relatively highly positive changes in carbon
intensity and highly negative changes in logged profit. The two largest such outliers are
Devon Energy Corporation and Newmont Mining Corporation. Removing both of those
from the sample results in an insignificant coefficient on change in carbon intensity. On
the hand, there are some outliers with highly positive changes in profit and no change or
highly negative change in carbon intensity. Removing Marathon Oil Corporation and
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Exxon Mobil from the sample at the same time as the other two outliers results in a
significantly negative coefficient.
The overall results seem to be sensitive to the addition and removal of outliers.
There are two qualifications to that sensitivity. First, results hold if I remove outliers from
both sides. Second, the outliers tend to be in the energy sector. In fact, all of the top 4
outliers are from the mining and gas industry. Removing outliers in one industry does not
significantly affect the coefficient in other industries.
Figure 921

21

Note that this graph uses colors to differentiate fitted and actual changes.

Fortune 40
VII. CONCLUSIONS
I find evidence to support the hypothesis that lower carbon intensity results in
greater profit for companies. I develop a theoretical model to explain how consumer
preference for low carbon intensity products can increase profit for oligarchic companies
with lower carbon intensity than competitors. Companies play a game in which they
choose to invest in carbon intensity reduction. The results of the theoretical model are
ambiguous, emphasizing the need for empirical evidence.
The empirical evidence supports that carbon intensity decreases profit. The
results hold up when the model controls for industry effects and differences. The models
with interaction terms complicate the results. My estimates of the carbon intensity
elasticity is -0.10. The effect is heterogeneous across industries – I find no effect for
some industries but a negative coefficient for others. The insignificant coefficients may
be the result of some industries having fewer observations in the data than others.
Because of this constraint, I conclude that carbon intensity matters more in some
industries than other, but I hesitate to say exactly for which industries carbon intensity
does not matter. The results when revenue is used as the dependent variable instead of
profit. This means that the results are robust to omitted variables that confound through
cost. The greatest cause for concern is endogeneity. If profitable companies can invest
more in carbon intensity reduction, then that would explain the negative coefficient. I
have no way to address endogeneity other than the theoretical arguments made in
section III.
There are potential upgrades to this thesis. While the differenced model does
some work to control for confounding variables, a fixed effects model would go a long
way to controlling for time-invariant confounding characteristics of firms. This model
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requires panel data with more observations for each group than currently available.
Firm-level data about energy-efficiency and low carbon energy prices would also help to
give more confidence that these variables do not cause the negative coefficient in these
models. I would also like to see about whether these results hold for similar companies
in other countries.
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Derivation of Equation (6) in the theory section:
The consumer’s utility function is
𝛽

𝑈 = 𝑥1𝛼 𝑥2 𝐶 𝛾
The consumer chooses 𝑥1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥2 to maximize U subject to their income.
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜗𝑥1

𝛽

𝑥2 𝜆

= 𝑥1𝛼 𝑥2 𝐶 𝛾 − 𝜆(𝑃1 𝑥1 + 𝑃2 𝑥2 − 𝐼)

There are three first order conditions:
(A1)

𝜕𝜗
𝜕𝑥1

= 𝛼𝑥1𝛼−1 𝑥2 𝐶 𝛾 + 𝑥1𝛼 𝑥2

(A2)

𝜕𝜗
𝜕𝑥2

= 𝛽𝑥1𝛼 𝑥2

(A3)

𝜕𝜗
𝜕𝜆

𝛽

𝛽−1 𝛾

𝛽 𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑥1

− 𝜆𝑃1 = 0

𝛽 𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑥2

− 𝜆𝑃2 = 0

𝐶 + 𝑥1𝛼 𝑥2

= 𝐼 − 𝑃1 𝑥1 − 𝑃2 𝑥2 = 0

Combining equations (A1) and (A2),
𝛽𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑥1

𝛽

(A4)

𝑥1𝛼−1 𝑥2 𝐶 𝛾 +𝑥1𝛼 𝑥2
𝑃1

=

𝛽−1 𝛾
𝛽𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝐶
𝐶 +𝑥1𝛼 𝑥2
𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑥2

𝛽𝑥1𝛼 𝑥2

𝑃2

With equations (A4) and (A3), there are two unsolved variables with two different
equations. By rearranging (A 3) so that only 𝑥2 is on the left hand side, I can substitute
𝑥2 into (A4). Rearranging gives the demand function
(A5)

𝑥1 =

−𝑃2 𝐶 𝛾 (𝛼+𝛽)

𝑃2

𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝐶
𝛽𝐶𝛾 𝑃2 𝑃1
−
∗𝑃1 −
𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑥1 𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑥2
𝐼
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Regressions Table 1: No interactions
(E1)
logEarnings

(E2)
logEarnings

(E3)
logEarnings

(E4)
D.logEarnings

-210.5***
(45.9)

-231.1***
(53.7)

-224.7***
(49.7)

-445.2***
(107.6)

Construction

-0.489
(0.586)

-0.781
(0.544)

0.0116
(0.555)

Entertainment

-0.825
(0.586)

-0.798
(0.543)

0.0560
(0.523)

Finance and Insurance

-1.091**
(0.471)

-1.649***
(0.443)

0.118
(0.442)

Food Services

-2.729***
(0.692)

-2.635***
(0.641)

-1.213**
(0.604)

Information

-0.845*
(0.483)

-0.849*
(0.447)

0.0813
(0.451)

Manufacturing 1

-1.427**
(0.568)

-1.370***
(0.527)

-0.177
(0.524)

Manufacturing 2

-0.832*
(0.473)

-0.797*
(0.438)

-0.0441
(0.442)

Manufacturing 3

-1.398***
(0.476)

-1.347***
(0.441)

0.0632
(0.445)

Mining and Gas
Extraction

-0.971**

-0.961**

-0.153

(0.478)

(0.443)

(0.450)

-1.624***

-1.550***

0.101

(0.546)

(0.506)

(0.506)

Real Estate

-2.440***
(0.609)

-2.367***
(0.564)

0.238
(0.552)

Retail Trade 1

-1.191**
(0.492)

-1.156**
(0.455)

-0.0929
(0.462)

Retail Trade 2

-1.144**
(0.525)

-1.113**
(0.486)

0.0391
(0.485)

VARIABLES
Carbon Intensity

Scientific and Technical
Services
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Transportation

-1.299**
(0.509)

-1.238***
(0.471)

0.0129
(0.468)

Utilities

-1.316**
(0.524)

-1.287***
(0.486)

-0.0918
(0.485)

Wholesale Trade

-1.635***
(0.484)

-1.562***
(0.449)

0.0478
(0.453)

0***
(0)

0
(0)

Assets

2012

-0.199
(0.126)

-0.178
(0.120)

-0.171
(0.111)

2013

0.0280
(0.128)

0.0261
(0.122)

0.0495
(0.113)

0.282***
(0.0871)

Constant

21.93***
(0.0940)

23.10***
(0.459)

22.98***
(0.425)

-0.123
(0.430)

343

343

343

197

Observations
Adjusted R-squared
F-Stat

0.0617
8.47

0.1602
0.2791
4.42
7.60
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.1270
2.50
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Regression Table 2: Interaction Models
(E5)
logEarnings
-1.177*
(0.682)

(E6)
D.logEarnings
-0.658
(1.378)

Entertainment

-1.794**
(0.763)

-0.482
(1.347)

Finance and Insurance

-1.949***
(0.485)

-0.504
(1.308)

Food Services

-3.165
(2.734)

-2.604*
(1.380)

Information

-0.979*
(0.502)

-0.457
(1.311)

Manufacturing 1

-0.741
(0.702)

-0.752
(1.336)

Manufacturing 2

-1.277***
(0.484)

-0.583
(1.309)

Manufacturing 3

-1.748***
(0.495)

-0.534
(1.309)

Mining and Gas Extraction

-1.062**
(0.502)

-0.665
(1.310)

Scientific and Technical Services

-2.147***
(0.779)

-0.571
(1.377)

-0.802
(3.348)

-0.617
(1.535)

Retail Trade 1

-1.850***
(0.500)

-0.673
(1.314)

Retail Trade 2

-2.741***
(0.711)

-0.797
(1.510)

Transportation

-2.335***
(0.882)

-0.554
(1.316)

Utilities

-2.183***
(0.557)

-0.730
(1.322)

VARIABLES
Construction

Real Estate
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Wholesale Trade

-2.261***
(0.504)

-0.507
(1.311)

-670***

-22.7

(228)

(59.4)

Construction#Carbon Intensity

-916
(1804)

-3.15
(6.77)

Entertainment#Carbon Intensity

10084
(10643)

-0.319
(200)

Finance and Insurance#Carbon Intensity

-6594***
(2464)

-1.04***
(0.315)

Food Services#Carbon Intensity

897
(18356)

-6.00***
(1.42)

Information#Carbon Intensity

-3758***

-0.336

(1311)

(0.511)

Manufacturing 1#Carbon Intensity

-2442***
(853)

-2.95
(5.53)

Manufacturing 2#Carbon Intensity

-230***
(79)

-0.813
(0.379)

Manufacturing 3#Carbon Intensity

-1191
(1235)

-0.969**
(0.359)

Mining and Gas Extraction#Carbon
Intensity

-590***

-1.13***

(134)

(0.269)

2409

-0.423

(9299)

(3.62)

-9575
(14089)

-5.26
(5.76)

Retail Trade 1#Carbon Intensity

436
(295)

-0.377
(0.288)

Retail Trade 2#Carbon Intensity

15446**

-0.203

Administrative and Waste
Management#Carbon Intensity

Scientific and Technical Services#Carbon
Intensity

Real Estate#Carbon Intensity
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(6411)

(0.802)

Transportation#Carbon Intensity

400
(764)

-3.89
(4.04)

Utilities#Carbon Intensity

-94
(72)

-0.265
(0.643)

Wholesale Trade#Carbon Intensity

567
(496)

-0.582
(0.524)

0***
(0)

-0
(0)

Assets

2012

-0.190*
(0.106)

2013

0.0490
(0.108)

0.311***
(0.0870)

Constant

23.47***
(0.469)

0.424
(1.299)

342

197

Observations
F-Stat
Adjusted R-squared

6.30
0.346
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

2.84
0.2470
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Table 6: Companies in Sample

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

company year
---------------------------------------------3M Company 2011
3M Company 2012
3M Company 2013
AFLAC Incorporated 2011
AFLAC Incorporated 2012
---------------------------------------------AFLAC Incorporated 2013
AT&T Inc. 2011
AT&T Inc. 2012
AT&T Inc. 2013
Abbott Laboratories 2011
---------------------------------------------Abbott Laboratories 2012
Abbott Laboratories 2013
Adobe Systems, Inc. 2013
Aetna Inc. 2012
Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. 2011
---------------------------------------------Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. 2012
Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. 2013
Allergan, Inc. 2011
Allergan, Inc. 2012
Allergan, Inc. 2013
---------------------------------------------Allstate Corporation 2011
Allstate Corporation 2013
Altria Group, Inc. 2011
Altria Group, Inc. 2012
American Express 2011
---------------------------------------------American Express 2012
American Express 2013
American Tower Corp. 2011
Amgen, Inc. 2011
Amgen, Inc. 2012
---------------------------------------------Amgen, Inc. 2013
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation 2011
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation 2013
Apache Corporation 2011
Apache Corporation 2012
---------------------------------------------Apache Corporation 2013
Automatic Data Processing, Inc. 2011
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38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Automatic Data Processing, Inc. 2012
Automatic Data Processing, Inc. 2013
BB&T Corporation 2011
---------------------------------------------Baker Hughes Incorporated 2011
Baker Hughes Incorporated 2012
Baker Hughes Incorporated 2013
Bank of America 2011
Bank of America 2012
---------------------------------------------Bank of America 2013
Baxter International Inc. 2011
Baxter International Inc. 2012
Baxter International Inc. 2013
Becton, Dickinson and Co. 2011
---------------------------------------------Becton, Dickinson and Co. 2012
Best Buy Co., Inc. 2011
Biogen Idec Inc. 2012
Biogen Idec Inc. 2013
Boeing Company 2011
---------------------------------------------Boeing Company 2012
Boeing Company 2013
Bristol-Myers Squibb 2011
Bristol-Myers Squibb 2012
Bristol-Myers Squibb 2013
---------------------------------------------CSX Corporation 2011
CSX Corporation 2012
CSX Corporation 2013
CVS Caremark Corporation 2011
CVS Caremark Corporation 2012
---------------------------------------------CVS Caremark Corporation 2013
Capital One Financial 2011
Capital One Financial 2012
Capital One Financial 2013
Caterpillar Inc. 2011
---------------------------------------------Celgene Corporation 2011
Celgene Corporation 2012
Celgene Corporation 2013
CenturyLink 2012
CenturyLink 2013
---------------------------------------------Chevron Corporation 2011
Chevron Corporation 2012
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78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Chevron Corporation 2013
Cisco Systems, Inc. 2011
Cisco Systems, Inc. 2012
---------------------------------------------Cisco Systems, Inc. 2013
Citigroup Inc. 2011
Citigroup Inc. 2012
Citigroup Inc. 2013
Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp.
---------------------------------------------Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp.
Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp.
Colgate Palmolive Company 2011
Colgate Palmolive Company 2012
ConocoPhillips 2011
---------------------------------------------ConocoPhillips 2012
ConocoPhillips 2013
Consolidated Edison, Inc. 2012
Corning Incorporated 2011
Corning Incorporated 2012
---------------------------------------------Corning Incorporated 2013
Costco Wholesale Corporation 2012
Costco Wholesale Corporation 2013
Cummins Inc. 2013
Deere & Company 2011
---------------------------------------------Deere & Company 2012
Deere & Company 2013
Dell Inc. 2011
Dell Inc. 2012
Devon Energy Corporation 2011
---------------------------------------------Devon Energy Corporation 2012
Dominion Resources, Inc. 2011
Dominion Resources, Inc. 2012
Dow Chemical Company 2011
Dow Chemical Company 2012
---------------------------------------------Dow Chemical Company 2013
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company
EMC Corporation 2011
---------------------------------------------EMC Corporation 2012
EMC Corporation 2013

2011
2012
2013

2011
2012
2013
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118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Eaton Corporation 2013
Ecolab Inc. 2012
Ecolab Inc. 2013
---------------------------------------------Eli Lilly & Co. 2011
Eli Lilly & Co. 2012
Eli Lilly & Co. 2013
Exelon Corporation 2011
Exelon Corporation 2012
---------------------------------------------Exelon Corporation 2013
Express Scripts Holding Company 2011
Express Scripts Holding Company 2012
Exxon Mobil Corporation 2011
Exxon Mobil Corporation 2012
---------------------------------------------Exxon Mobil Corporation 2013
FedEx Corporation 2011
FedEx Corporation 2012
FedEx Corporation 2013
Ford Motor Company 2012
---------------------------------------------Ford Motor Company 2013
Franklin Resources, Inc. 2011
Franklin Resources, Inc. 2012
Franklin Resources, Inc. 2013
Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. 2011
---------------------------------------------Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. 2012
Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. 2013
General Electric Company 2011
General Electric Company 2012
General Electric Company 2013
---------------------------------------------General Mills Inc. 2011
General Mills Inc. 2012
General Mills Inc. 2013
General Motors Company 2012
General Motors Company 2013
---------------------------------------------Gilead Sciences, Inc. 2011
Gilead Sciences, Inc. 2012
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 2011
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 2012
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 2013
---------------------------------------------Google Inc. 2011
Google Inc. 2012
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158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Google Inc. 2013
H.J. Heinz Company 2012
HCP Inc. 2012
---------------------------------------------HCP Inc. 2013
Halliburton Company 2012
Halliburton Company 2013
Hess Corporation 2011
Hess Corporation 2012
---------------------------------------------Hess Corporation 2013
Hewlett-Packard 2011
Hewlett-Packard 2012
Hewlett-Packard 2013
Honeywell International Inc. 2012
---------------------------------------------Honeywell International Inc. 2013
Intel Corporation 2011
Intel Corporation 2012
Intel Corporation 2013
International Business Machines (IBM) 2011
---------------------------------------------International Business Machines (IBM) 2012
International Business Machines (IBM) 2013
Intuit Inc. 2012
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 2011
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 2012
---------------------------------------------JPMorgan Chase & Co. 2013
Johnson & Johnson 2011
Johnson & Johnson 2012
Johnson & Johnson 2013
Johnson Controls 2011
---------------------------------------------Johnson Controls 2012
Johnson Controls 2013
Kellogg Company 2011
Kellogg Company 2012
Kellogg Company 2013
---------------------------------------------Kimberly-Clark Corporation 2011
Kimberly-Clark Corporation 2012
Kimberly-Clark Corporation 2013
Kohl's Corporation 2011
Lockheed Martin Corporation 2011
---------------------------------------------Lowe's Companies, Inc. 2012
Lowe's Companies, Inc. 2013
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198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Marathon Oil Corporation 2011
Marathon Oil Corporation 2012
Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. 2012
---------------------------------------------Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. 2013
MasterCard Incorporated 2013
Medtronic, Inc. 2011
Medtronic, Inc. 2012
Medtronic, Inc. 2013
---------------------------------------------Merck & Co., Inc. 2011
Merck & Co., Inc. 2012
Merck & Co., Inc. 2013
MetLife, Inc. 2012
Microsoft Corporation 2011
---------------------------------------------Microsoft Corporation 2012
Microsoft Corporation 2013
Monsanto Company 2011
Monsanto Company 2012
Monsanto Company 2013
---------------------------------------------Morgan Stanley 2011
Morgan Stanley 2012
Morgan Stanley 2013
Motorola Solutions 2011
NIKE Inc. 2011
---------------------------------------------NIKE Inc. 2012
NetApp Inc. 2011
Newmont Mining Corporation 2011
Newmont Mining Corporation 2012
Newmont Mining Corporation 2013
---------------------------------------------Noble Energy, Inc. 2012
Noble Energy, Inc. 2013
Norfolk Southern Corp. 2011
Norfolk Southern Corp. 2012
Norfolk Southern Corp. 2013
---------------------------------------------Northrop Grumman Corp 2011
Occidental Petroleum Corporation 2011
Occidental Petroleum Corporation 2012
Occidental Petroleum Corporation 2013
Oracle Corporation 2011
---------------------------------------------Oracle Corporation 2013
PG&E Corporation 2011

Fortune 56
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

PG&E Corporation 2012
PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.
PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.
---------------------------------------------PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.
PPG Industries, Inc. 2013
PepsiCo, Inc. 2011
PepsiCo, Inc. 2012
PepsiCo, Inc. 2013
---------------------------------------------Pfizer Inc. 2011
Pfizer Inc. 2012
Pfizer Inc. 2013
Praxair, Inc. 2011
Praxair, Inc. 2012
---------------------------------------------Praxair, Inc. 2013
Procter & Gamble Company 2011
Procter & Gamble Company 2012
Procter & Gamble Company 2013
Prudential Financial, Inc. 2011
---------------------------------------------Prudential Financial, Inc. 2012
Prudential Financial, Inc. 2013
Public Service Enterprise Group Inc.
QUALCOMM Inc. 2011
QUALCOMM Inc. 2012
---------------------------------------------QUALCOMM Inc. 2013
Raytheon Company 2011
Raytheon Company 2012
Raytheon Company 2013
Reynolds American Inc. 2011
---------------------------------------------Reynolds American Inc. 2012
Reynolds American Inc. 2013
Schlumberger Limited 2011
Schlumberger Limited 2012
Schlumberger Limited 2013
---------------------------------------------Simon Property Group 2011
Simon Property Group 2012
Simon Property Group 2013
Spectra Energy Corp 2012
Spectra Energy Corp 2013
---------------------------------------------Starbucks Corporation 2011
Starbucks Corporation 2012

2011
2012
2013

2011
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278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Starbucks Corporation 2013
State Street Corporation 2011
State Street Corporation 2012
---------------------------------------------State Street Corporation 2013
Sysco Corporation 2013
TJX Companies, Inc. 2011
TJX Companies, Inc. 2012
TJX Companies, Inc. 2013
---------------------------------------------Target Corporation 2011
Target Corporation 2012
Target Corporation 2013
Texas Instruments Incorporated 2011
Texas Instruments Incorporated 2012
---------------------------------------------Texas Instruments Incorporated 2013
The Chubb Corporation 2012
The Chubb Corporation 2013
The Coca-Cola Company 2012
The Coca-Cola Company 2013
---------------------------------------------The Home Depot, Inc. 2011
The Home Depot, Inc. 2012
The Home Depot, Inc. 2013
The Travelers Companies, Inc. 2011
The Travelers Companies, Inc. 2012
---------------------------------------------The Travelers Companies, Inc. 2013
Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. 2012
Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. 2013
Time Warner Inc. 2011
Time Warner Inc. 2012
---------------------------------------------Time Warner Inc. 2013
U.S. Bancorp 2011
U.S. Bancorp 2012
U.S. Bancorp 2013
UPS 2011
---------------------------------------------UPS 2012
UPS 2013
Union Pacific Corporation 2011
Union Pacific Corporation 2012
Union Pacific Corporation 2013
---------------------------------------------United Technologies Corporation 2011
United Technologies Corporation 2012
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318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

United Technologies Corporation 2013
UnitedHealth Group Inc 2012
UnitedHealth Group Inc 2013
---------------------------------------------Ventas Inc 2013
Verizon Communications Inc. 2011
Verizon Communications Inc. 2012
Verizon Communications Inc. 2013
Visa 2013
---------------------------------------------Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 2011
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 2012
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 2013
Walgreen Company 2011
Walt Disney Company 2011
---------------------------------------------Walt Disney Company 2012
Walt Disney Company 2013
Waste Management, Inc. 2011
Wells Fargo & Company 2011
Wells Fargo & Company 2012
---------------------------------------------Wells Fargo & Company 2013
Yahoo! Inc. 2012
Yahoo! Inc. 2013
Yum! Brands, Inc. 2012
Yum! Brands, Inc. 2013
---------------------------------------------eBay Inc. 2011
eBay Inc. 2012
eBay Inc. 2013
+----------------------------------------------+

